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Chapter 6
How Much Knowledge Is Necessary 
for Action?
Joachim Funke
How much knowledge is necessary for action? This question is fundamental because 
it suggests that the link between knowledge and action is debatable, that there is no 
given, fixed causal relationship between knowledge and action. In addition, there 
seems to be no fixed causal direction. Knowledge can be a prerequisite for action 
but also a consequence of an action. My opening question relates two key words in 
psychology. One of them is knowledge, about which a large body of knowledge 
exists (e.g., Halford, Wilson, & Phillips, 2010)—about its different types (e.g., pro-
cedural, declarative), styles of acquisition (implicit, explicit), and degrees of acces-
sibility (conscious, subconscious, unconscious). The other word is action, about 
which there are various theories describing human behavior with respect to inten-
tion (e.g., Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010). In this introductory section I try to give an 
overview of these conceptions and of the relation between knowledge and action.
The issues around the keywords knowledge and action—which constitute the 
title of a book by Frey, Mandl, and von Rosenstiel (2006)—are captured by the fol-
lowing four main aspects, which generate corresponding questions.
 1. The relation between knowledge and action. From the perspective of the psy-
chology of knowledge (e.g., Strube & Wender, 1993), knowledge is a compe-
tence for action, a precondition. What is known about the relation between 
knowledge and action and what is not known? How much of human action is 
governed by routines, experience, intuition, and knowledge? What is the trade- 
off between taking action and improving knowledge?
 2. Types of knowledge and different phases. To what extent do various types of 
knowledge (e.g., implicit or explicit) influence the steps from cognition to action 
(e.g., aspirations, attention, decision-making, problem-solving, the evaluation of 
situations, the search for alternatives, and the implementation of intentions)?
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 3. Rationality and knowledge. What categories of rationality should be identified? 
Concepts of rationality are common ground in social and economic theories, but 
rationality in everyday life seems to be something else. To what degree does the 
concept of bounded rationality (Simon, 1947, p. 61–65) weaken the link between 
knowledge and action? Is there a threshold of minimal knowledge that is neces-
sary for action?
 4. Action theory and language. How constitutive is language use for action? Searle 
(1969), with his concept of speech acts, points out that speaking can be acting. 
To speak about X requires knowing something about X. If someone is not able to 
speak about Z, can that person act upon Z or does the inability to speak about Z 
imply the inability to act upon Z? What about the idea that “actions speak louder 
than words” (Tanner, Brügger, van Schie, & Lebherz, 2010)?
The contribution from my own empirical work addresses mainly the first and at 
least in part the second of these four main aspects, leaving many of the other ques-
tions to the reader.
After a short section on definitions, I ask whether action is possible without 
knowledge and afterward venture the question of whether it is possible for people to 
act against their own knowledge. Thereafter, I review some of the standard views on 
the relation between knowledge and action, interpretations that may help this chap-
ter’s exploration of that connection through three theories: planned behavior, uncon-
scious thought, and the option-generation framework. The chapter then continues 
with empirical evidence from my own research area, problem-solving, and shows 
that the relation between knowledge and action is strong within that area.
 Definitions of Knowledge and Action
 Knowledge and Belief
Knowledge is not always knowledge; it is necessary to distinguish between knowl-
edge and true belief. A person who believes that leaves of a red tree are green defi-
nitely knows about his or her belief. Hence, there is knowledge that depends on 
states in the outer world (it being a purely empirical question whether the leaves are 
green or red) and on other knowledge that is a priori true (i.e., my knowledge about 
my beliefs). In the philosophy of language, this position is called externalism. For 
the issues considered in this chapter, it suffices to state that I am talking about the 
person’s internal knowledge not at a metalevel but rather at the level of assertions 
that are believed to be true.
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 Types of Knowledge
The distinction between explicit (verbalizable, declarative) and implicit (nonverbal-
izable, tacit) knowledge is well known and relates to the distinction between con-
scious and nonconscious knowledge. Cognitive processes in general are often seen 
as working in two modes, a deliberate, conscious one and an automatic noncon-
scious type of processing (e.g., Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2011).
 Action
The definition of action as goal-directed human activity helps set it apart from pure 
behavior (e.g., sneezing, which is not directed to any particular goal). Action is that 
part of behavior which occurs intentionally. Keep in mind that even trial-and-error 
behavior could be classified as action if it happens intentionally.
 Is Action Possible Without Knowledge?
Is action possible without knowledge? Can one really posit that idea as a serious 
option? If one takes the term action to mean goal-directed human activity, the 
answer must be no. Action implies goals, and in order to realize goals a person 
needs appropriate means. The means–end connection is knowledge—to know that 
one can use bamboo sticks to fetch a banana lying just beyond arm’s reach outside 
the bars of a cage was an important insight to Sultan, the most intelligent chimpan-
zee analyzed by Köhler (1925).
But what is the relation between goals and knowledge? Are goals part of what 
people call knowledge or are they a separate entity only derivative of knowledge? In 
my understanding, knowledge is a piece of subjectively acquired information about 
the world. In German one would say that knowledge about the world is angeeignet 
(appropriated, assimilated, internalized). In a certain sense it could be construed as 
embodied information.
But how is embodied information linked to goals? Goals are representations of 
future states and derive their power from the possibility of finding a way from the 
given present state to an envisioned future state. When talking about goals, people 
always talk about degrees of distance between the given and the goal state. Because 
the path from the given state to the goal state is sometimes not easy to discover, 
problem-solving comes into play. Indeed, the epistemologist Karl Popper (1999) 
argued that “all life is problem solving.”
To answer the question of whether action is possible without knowledge, I must 
thus conclude that the use of the word action logically implies the connection to 
some background representation, which is normally called knowledge.
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 Is Action Possible Against One’s Better Knowledge?
It may be more interesting to ask whether action is possible against knowledge. The 
question is related to the understanding of human rationality. Newell (1981) stated 
the principle of rationality simply by saying, “if an agent has knowledge that one of 
its actions will lead to one of its goals, then the agent will select that action” (p. 8). 
This principle would not allow a person to act against her or his goals.
Yet everyday experience brims with examples to the contrary. People love ani-
mals—but at the same time do not hesitate to slaughter them professionally in the 
slaughterhouse. Concern about climate change is widespread, though people con-
tinue to pollute the environment by driving big cars. The gaps between attitude and 
behavior are large, but are attitude and behavior the same as knowledge and action? 
Take smoking for example. Evidence indisputably shows that smoking is detrimen-
tal to human health, but people continue to smoke despite their knowledge of this 
fact. Are they acting against their knowledge? I would say, no! Given even such 
blatant violations of their own attitudes, people follow principles of bounded ratio-
nality. When smoking despite knowledge about the negative consequences of that 
behavior, a person might argue, “Yes, I know about the negative effects, but my 
family has a very good gene pool, so I do not assume I’ll get cancer as easily as 
normal people will.” This argumentation conveys a kind of justification for behavior 
that, from the viewpoint of the individual, is no longer irrational but instead has its 
own limited rationality.
 Can Knowledge Impede Action?
Planning before taking action is usually thought to be wise, but it can have disad-
vantages. Although having plans generally makes people more likely to act on a 
goal than they would without them, an experiment reported by Masicampo and 
Baumeister (2012) showed that subjects who had devised plans to achieve a goal 
failed at that task, particularly when it was essential to recognize and seize an alter-
native opportunity in order to succeed. The authors concluded that with sufficient 
(unlimited) time a previously learned specific plan increased attainment of the goal, 
replicating the usual benefit of planning. With insufficient time, however, the spe-
cific plan impaired performance because participants failed to capitalize on an alter-
native opportunity for accomplishing the goal. The final conclusion by Masicampo 
and Baumeister was that plans can drastically decrease overall rates of attainment 
when openness to alternatives is crucial to success.
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 The Relation Between Knowledge and Action
What are the standard views on the relation between knowledge and action? I con-
centrate on three approaches that posit assumptions about this relationship: (a) the 
theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991), (b) the theory of unconscious thought 
(Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006), and (c) the option-generation framework (Kalis, 
Mojzisch, Schweizer, & Kaiser, 2008).
 The Theory of Planned Behavior
The theory of planned behavior formulated by Ajzen (1991) has become one of the 
best-known theories in psychology. Roughly, it states that behavior depends on the 
intention or resolve of the individual to behave in a certain way, say, to exercise at 
least five times a week. Intention itself depends on a behavioral attitude (e.g., exer-
cising at least five times a week would be good/bad), subjective norms (e.g., most 
people important to the person think that she or he should exercise at least five times 
a week), and perceived behavioral control (e.g., exercising at least five times a week 
would be easy/difficult). This theory, in its new versions, is referred to as the “rea-
soned action approach” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010).
As depicted in Fig. 6.1, action depends on previous knowledge in the form of 
intention. The empirical evidence bearing out this theory is impressive, with meta- 
analyses of empirical studies (Armitage & Conner, 2001; Manning, 2009) over-









Fig. 6.1 The main elements that constitute the theory of reasoned action. Behavioral attitude, 
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control causes intention that brings about behavior 
(with additional influence from perceived behavioral control)
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behavior. But is this finding really a surprise? Werner Greve, a psychologist from 
Hildesheim University, has argued that the empirical success of the theory of 
planned behavior is not astonishing. According to him, the connection between 
intention and action is logical, not causal. In his article “Traps and Gaps in Action 
Explanation” (2001), he stated that intention is an inherent part of what is called 
action. Speaking about action therefore implies the assumption that an intention 
must exist to carry out a certain action.
The consequence of Greve’s (2001) argument is clear. In his view most of the 
empirical studies on the theory of planned action are pseudoempirical research in 
that things that are true a priori are proven empirically. If a person intends to diet 
and sometime later starts to undergo dietary treatment, that action comes as no sur-
prise. It is a logical consequence of the fact that at some time t a person decides to 
begin dietary treatment and then at time t + 1 the diet really commences. But what 
about the cases in which persons do not start their dietary treatment? Would their 
lapse falsify the logical connection between intention and action? No, it would only 
mean that the intention was not strong enough to reach a threshold needed to turn 
intention into behavior.
 The Theory of Unconscious Thought
A second approach is the theory of unconscious thought (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 
2006). The basic idea is that the quality of decision-making depends on conscious 
and unconscious thought simultaneously. The term conscious thought is understood 
to mean a mental state that encompasses a person’s rational awareness, whereas the 
term unconscious thought refers to the underlying influence, of which one is typi-
cally unaware and which has an impact on one’s behavior. Unconscious thought 
takes place when conscious attention is directed elsewhere. Unconscious thought 
tends to outmatch conscious thought, especially in complex and untransparent 
situations.
The relative impacts that conscious and unconscious thought can have on 
decision- making become evident in the data from experiments by Dijksterhuis, Bos, 
Nordgren, and van Baaren (2006). The task for participants was to choose the most 
favorable car from a selection of cars that were described by only four aspects (the 
simple situation) or as many as twelve aspects (complex situation). Part (a) of Fig. 
6.2 shows the percentage of persons who chose the best option; part (b), as a sec-
ondary measure, shows the difference in attitude toward the best option. The left- 
hand set of two bars in part (a) shows that most of the subjects made the correct 
decision in the simple situation if they were in a conscious-thought mode (repre-
sented by the white bar). But when the complexity of the task increased to twelve 
aspects, as is shown in the right-hand set of bars in part (b), the mode of uncon-
scious thought has a great advantage over that of conscious thought, a finding that 
supports the theory by Dijksterhuis and Nordgren (2006). As part (b) of Fig. 6.2 
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illustrates, not only are the decisions improved by unconscious thought but the atti-
tude toward the desirable and undesirable car depends on the mode of thought.
 The Option-Generation Framework
A third theory that deals with the relation between knowledge and action is the 
option-generation framework by Kalis et al. (2008). Studying the weakness of will 
(a phenomenon known as acrasia), these researchers concentrated on option genera-
tion, a little-understood process that precedes option selection and action 
initiation.
Figure 6.3 illustrates the idealized process of option generation, option selection, 
and action initiation and gives the background of the ideas that Kalis et al. (2008) 
have about degenerative processes in this area. Table 6.1 affords an overview of the 
ways in which dysfunctions in option generation can result in irrational behavior. 
The table presents two dimensions—dysfunction in the quantity of options (hypo-
generation and hypergeneration) and dysfunction in the quality of options. The two 
rows separate instrumental irrationality from noninstrumental irrationality, meaning 
that options can be seen either as a means to realize certain goals (i.e., the instru-
mental understanding) or as irrationality in the goals themselves (i.e., noninstru-
mental irrationality). This concept links knowledge and action in a special way: It 
makes a connection between options and actions.
Fig. 6.2 Decision-making criteria for choosing a car: (a) Percentage of participants who chose the 
most desirable car as a function of complexity of decision and of mode of thought (n = 18 to 22 in 
each condition). Error bars represent the standard error. (b) Difference in attitude (on a scale of –25 
to +25) toward the desirable and undesirable car as a function of complexity of decision and of 
mode of thought (n = 12 to 14 in each condition). Error bars [the vertical lines above the bars] 
represent the standard error (Reprinted from Dijksterhuis et al. (2006, p. 1005) with permission 
from the American Association for the Advancement of Science)
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This walk through the three theories on the connection between knowledge and 
action gives an understanding of current approaches to that area of inquiry. In this 
chapter’s final section I bring to this subject empirical evidence from my own 
research area, problem-solving.
 Evidence From Problem-Solving Research
What is meant by problem-solving? In my understanding, problem-solving is the 
intentional generation of knowledge for action instead of simple trial-and-error 
behavior. From the perspective of a problem-solving approach, the connection 
between knowledge and action is a classical means–end relation. The question 
remains how one can demonstrate that subjects generate knowledge intentionally 
Fig. 6.3 Stages of decision making in our model. (Kalis et al., 2008, p. 403) (Copyright 2008 by 
Springer Science + Business Media. With permission of Springer)
Table 6.1 Six types of irrational behavior
Irrationality
Dysfunction in quantity of options Dysfunction in 
quality of optionsHypogeneration Hypergeneration
Instrumental (1) Absence of options 
leads to leads to 
reduced effectiveness 
in attaining one’s 
goals.
(2) An increase in the 
number of options 
leads to problems in 
selection and initiation.
(3) Options are 
inadequate means 
to one’s goals.
Noninstrumental (4) Absence of goals 
leads to a reduction in 
one’s options.
(5) An increase in the 
number of goals leads 
to defocused option 
generation.
(6) Options are 
means to goals that 
are themselves 
irrational.
Based on Kalis et al. (2008, pp. 407–411)
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for action? My tentative answer comes from experiments in which researchers pres-
ent subjects with problems by using multistep tasks of reasonable complexity 
(Funke, 2010).
Figure 6.4 illustrates the MicroDyn approach, which was implemented for the 
2012 cycle of the OECD’s worldwide Programme for International Student 
Assessment (PISA) (Wüstenberg, Greiff, & Funke, 2012). In the upper part is a 
screenshot of a small scenario, called “Handball Training.” It involves three types of 
training—A, B, and C (input variables). The task of the problem-solver is to find out 
how the types of training influence the three output variables (motivation, power of 
throw, and exhaustion). The problem-solver can change the amount of training and 
will see the response on the side displaying the output variables. Giving certain 
amounts of input, as in this example, seems to increase the motivation level and 
decrease exhaustion.
The experiments that my colleagues and I have designed and conducted typically 
have three stages (see Fig. 6.5). First, subjects have to explore the system for about 
3 min. This stage is “information retrieval” because in unguided explorations sub-
jects generate information for the second stage, “model-building.” This second 
stage requires reflection about the causal model behind the different entities. There 
are assumed connections between input and output; training A, for example, 
increases motivation only. The third stage is “forecasting” and requires the subjects 
to achieve given values on the various endogenous variables—the output variables 
in this example—by entering the correct values into the system. In such experiments 
subjects have to work on many similar tasks. This requirement allows for psycho-
metrically sound measurement of the three abilities—information retrieval, model- 
building, and forecasting (for more details, see Greiff & Funke, 2009; Wüstenberg 
et al., 2012).
As demonstrated by the results of the studies reported in this section, a clear con-
nection exists between the generation of knowledge and the application of that 
knowledge (action). This structural equation model with three latent variables 
shows that model-building is a major prerequisite for the two other postulated abili-
ties, forecasting and information retrieval. The fit between this model and the data 
is fine and allows acceptance of the model. My colleagues and I have also con-
structed a measurement model that sequences the three abilities—information 
retrieval, model-building, and forecasting. It is simple, another characteristic that 
fits the data well. Our empirical results thus reveal strong connections between 
knowledge and action. Acting on a system requires knowledge about the system’s 
structure if goals are to be attained successfully.
Berry and Broadbent (1984) argued that this system knowledge need not be ver-
balizable and explicit and that, instead, implicit knowledge might guide the action 
of subjects controlling a system. They even postulated a negative correlation 
between control performance and verbalizable knowledge. But Buchner, Funke, 
and Berry (1995) showed that this explanation is not fully convincing, for the only 
subjects who acquired knowledge about the system were those who were not able to 
accomplish the given goal immediately.

































































































































































































Knowledge and action is an interesting relationship! As I have shown, there are 
conscious and unconscious influences, and they are primarily logical, not causal. 
Kaiser, Wölfing, and Fuhrer (1999), who analyzed the relation between environ-
mental knowledge, environmental values, and ecological behavior (intention as well 
as observed behavior), concluded on the basis of structural equation modeling that 
only 40 % of the variance in the intention that it entails was attributable to knowl-
edge and values but that this intention explained 75 % of the variance in observed 
behavior. From the viewpoint of action, I have concluded that it is not possible to act 
without knowledge but that we humans can act—at least at a surface level—against 
our knowledge! For God’s sake, may all persons in our small world act in concor-
dance with their knowledge.
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